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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the dramatic increases in rice output and productivity in Vietnam due largely 
to market reform, inducing farmers to work harder and use land more efficiently. The reform 
process is captured through changes in effort variables and a decomposition of total factor 
productivity (TFP) due to enhanced incentives for two main reform periods: output contracts 
(1981-87) and trade liberalization (1988-94). The results show that the more extensive is market 
reform the larger the increase in TFP and the share of TFP growth due to incentive effects, 
suggesting that more competitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly. 
 
However, in the post-reform period (1995-99), the incentive component of TFP dissipates as a 
result of falls in the price of rice and slow increases in input prices, especially for hired labour, 
fertilizer and capital. A stochastic production frontier is estimated to determine what farm-specific 
factors limit efficiency gains. Results show that farms in the main rice growing regions, those with 
larger farm size and farms with a higher proportion of rice land ploughed by tractor are more 
efficient, suggesting the need for additional reforms to augment productvity. In particular, the 
requirement that rice be grown in every province in Vietnam, restrictions on farm size (especially 
in the north) and the slow development of rural credit markets for capital and land are seen to 
restrict the level and growth of efficiency substantially. 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dramatic increases in rice output and produc-
tivity in Vietnam due largely to market reform, inducing farmers to work
harder and use land more eﬃciently. The reform process is captured through
changes in eﬀort variables and a decomposition of total factor productivity
(TFP) due to enhanced incentives for two main reform periods: output con-
tracts (1981-87) and trade liberalization (1988-94). The results show that
the more extensive is market reform the larger the increase in TFP and the
share of TFP growth due to incentive eﬀects, suggesting that more compet-
itive markets and secure property rights matter greatly.
However, in the post-reform period (1995-99), the incentive component
of TFP dissipates as a result of falls in the price of rice and slow increases in
input prices, especially for hired labour, fertilizer and capital. A stochastic
production frontier is estimated to determine what farm-specific factors limit
eﬃciency gains. Results show that farms in the main rice growing regions,
those with larger farm size and farms with a higher proportion of rice land
ploughed by tractor are more eﬃcient, suggesting the need for additional
reforms to augment productvity. In particular, the requirement that rice be
grown in every province in Vietnam, restrictions on farm size (especially in
the north) and the slow development of rural credit markets for capital and
land are seen to restrict the level and growth of eﬃciency substantially.
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of its ‘doi moi’ market reform process in 1981, Vietnam has
achieved remarkable success in increasing the output of rice. From being a large
importer of rice throughout the early 1980’s, Vietnam has now become the third
largest exporter of rice in the world, with the total output of all agricultural
products more than doubling during the main period of reforms from 1981 to
1994.1 Even more notable is the fact that these gains have been achieved with a
relatively modest growth of most inputs and with little or no technological change.
The market reform process in Vietnamese agriculture over this period has been
pervasive, including a significant liberalization of internal and external trade,
greater autonomy for farmers in decision making and fundamental institutional
change including the reform of the property rights regime. This paper argues that
this considerable market reform has greatly enhanced the incentives for farmers
to work hard and to use land more eﬃciently, and thus largely explains the
dramatic increases in rice output and productivity. The reform process itself is
captured through changes in eﬀort variables and a decomposition of total factor
productivity (TFP) due to enhanced incentives for two main reform periods:
output contracts (1981-87) and trade liberalization (1988-94). The results show
that the more extensive is market reform the larger the increase in TFP and the
share of TFP growth due to incentive eﬀects, suggesting that more competitive
markets and secure property rights matter greatly.
However, in the post-reform period (1995-99), the incentive component of
TFP dissipates as a result of falls in the price of rice and slow increases in input
prices, especially for hired labour, fertilizer and capital. A stochastic production
frontier is estimated to determine what farm-specific factors limit eﬃciency gains.
Results show that farms in the main rice growing regions, those with larger farm
size and farms with a higher proportion of rice land ploughed by tractor are more
eﬃcient, suggesting the need for additional reforms to augment productivity. In
particular, the requirement that rice be grown in every province in Vietnam,
restrictions on farm size (especially in the north) and the slow development of
rural credit markets for capital and land are seen to restrict the level and growth
of eﬃciency substantially.
Section 2 of the paper provides some background, briefly describing rice pro-
duction in Vietnam and the characteristics of the main market reform periods.
Data sources and variable construction are detailed in section 3 and in an appen-
dix to the paper. Following McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989) and Che, Kompas
and Vousden (2001), sections 4.1 to 4.3 present the basic model be used to explain
the eﬀects of market reform on rice output and productivity. The model captures
market reform measures through policy induced changes in TFP and a decom-
position of TFP into productivity changes due to enhanced incentive eﬀects from
1The output of rice itself increased from 12,415 in 1981 to 23,528 thousand tons in 1994
(GSO, 1995), increasing further to 31,315 thousand tons in 1999.
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those due to other ‘unexplained’ factors.2 In Section 4.4, estimates of a production
function from provincial level panel data for the years 1991 to 1999 are used to ob-
tain measures of TFP with market reform over an aggregate data set. Section 4.5
estimates the contribution of incentive eﬀects to productivity growth over the two
main and post reform periods. The process of market reform is captured through
the eﬀects of changes in policy and market parameters on average per unit profits.
There are two things to consider here. First, in transitional economies the share
of output that accrues to the state authority varies under diﬀerent institutional
settings, from communal systems to share-contracting schemes and finally to pri-
vate competitive markets with taxes on retained earnings. Prices received by
farmers for their product also vary considerably across these regimes. To capture
such changes, this paper estimates an eﬀective output price (the farmer’s share
of output multiplied by the actual output price) over time. With market reform
it is asserted that both actual and eﬀective prices increase, and this is certainly
true in the case of Vietnam. With the reform process, in other words, output is
directed over time toward markets where prices are higher and the share of output
apportioned to the state government for centrally-directed distribution falls.
Second, in transitional economies, factor and product prices generally increase
at diﬀerent rates with market reform. In the paper this process is characterized
through a weighted-cost share parameter which measures the ratio of average
factor to product prices under various institutional arrangements. As is true for
most transitional economies, and again this is the case for Vietnam, the value of
this share-cost parameter falls with reform. Changes in factor prices lag behind
the increases in product prices and the result implies that average per unit profits
rise over time. This, combined with a rising eﬀective price of output, generates
the emerging profits function developed in the paper. It is not until the post-
reform (1995-96) period that input prices finally begin to rise. This, combined
with the fall in the world price of rice, decreases per unit average profits and so
dissipates the incentive eﬀect.
Section 5.1 reviews the basics of stochastic frontiers and technical ineﬃciency
models. Section 5.2 provides the econometric specification and 5.3 summarizes
the results. A well-known concern with standard stochastic production frontiers
is that they generally assume that all firms share a similar technology. However,
for rice production in Vietnam this is not a serious problem. Although input
proportions vary, rice is grown basically in the same way, using the same inputs,
in each of the sixty provinces. Diﬀerences in natural conditions and the level of
usage of common inputs, such as tractors, can be accounted for by the appropri-
ate variables in the eﬃciency model. This aside, the key advantage of stochastic
production frontiers is that of being able to model the firm-specific factors which
determine eﬃciency diﬀerences directly, which is essential for forming an assess-
2Che, Kompas and Vousden (2001) extend the static model to the case of an intertemporal
economy where incentive eﬀects result in induced capital formation and both larger transitional
growth rates and steady state values for rice output.
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ment of the eﬀects of government policy on rice production in Vietnam.3 Section
6 concludes.
2. Background
2.1. Rice production in Vietnam
Rice is the most significant industry in Vietnamese agriculture. With market re-
form, the proportion of rice in foodstuﬀ production, in terms of output (unhusked
rice equivalent), has increased from 80.8 per cent in 1980 to 97.6 per cent in 1996
(SDAFF, 2001). Rice production also absorbs the greatest percentage of the
labour force in rural areas, where about 70 per cent of workers in the Vietnamese
economy live, and on average contributes 67 per cent of household income (WB,
1995). In addition, rice production is a crucial source of nutrition for the popula-
tion. In Vietnam, starch-products make up 90 per cent of daily nourishment and
of that rice supplies 83.1 per cent of the calorie intake in the rural regions and
77.6 per cent in urban areas (MAFI, 1987, SDP,1995a). Moreover, rice accounts
for roughly 24 per cent of total export revenue (SDAFF, 2001).
Vietnam is naturally suited for rice production, especially for so-called wet
rice production. Located in a tropical area with high humidity, the weather is
especially amenable and the land is fertile. With this, Vietnam is also blessed
with an advantageous water system, with an extensive network of rivers, favor-
able topography and rain fall patterns (WB, 1996a). Rice is planted in every
province in Vietnam (with the exception of Ba Ria-Vung Tau, the so—called, Spe-
cial Petroleum Processing Zone, which is excluded in this study). However, the
most important rice areas are the Red River Delta (RRD) in the north and the
Mekong River Delta (MRD) in the south. Together the two deltas account for 70
per cent of total rice output in Vietnam.
The MRD with an area of 3.9 million hectares has 2.1 million hectares used for
rice production, with an agricultural population of 11.7 million (SDAFF, 2001).
This rice area was formed by the alluvial soil raised by the Mekong and Bassac
rivers. Flooding often threatens around 25 per cent of the sown area and induces
poor crops (SDP, 1995a), but generally favorable conditions in the allow for a
triple rice crop during the year; the Winter-Spring crop between March and May,
the Summer-Autumn crop between August and September and the Winter crop
from December to the following January.
The area of the RRD is 1.7 million hectares, providing 0.6 million hectares for
rice production, with an agriculture population of 10.6 million (SDAFF, 2001).
Flooding is also a problem, but as a whole the irrigation system is much better
than that in the MRD and consequently maintains a stable water supply for at
3For a useful discussion of stochastic production frontiers and alternative techniques, see Kali-
rajan and Shand (1999). Useful alternatives to the standard approach include Huang and Liu’s
(1994) construction of ‘non-neutral’ stochastic frontiers and Tsionas’s (2002) use of stochastic
frontiers with random coeﬃcients.
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least 85 per cent of the total area. Overall, the conditions of the alluvial soil and
the weather are less favorable than that in the MRD, with roughly 88 per cent of
the total rice area cultivated providing double or triple harvests per year: mainly
the Winter-Spring crop between May and June, and the Winter crop between
November and December (SDP, 1995a).
In general, both rice output (figure 1) and net exports (figure 2) have in-
creased dramatically in the 1990s, with annual growth rates in output alone of
over 5.5 per cent throughout the period. Although there has been relatively
little technological change in the way in rice is produced in Vietnam, and cer-
tainly nothing like the ‘green revolution’ that characterizes other transitional and
developing countries, rice output and total factor productivity appears to have
increased due to enhanced crop rotation and new and higher quality seeds. In
addition, total irrigated area has increased from 1.2 million hectares in 1976 to
1.88 million hectares in 1994 (MRW, 1994), and the amount of fertilizer use in
terms of nitrogen, phosphates and potassium (NPK) in 1994 was 3.5 times that
of 1976 (GSO, 1995).
2.2. Market reform periods
The relevant transitional periods for rice production in Vietnam can be divided
into the communal system (1975—80), used as a base comparison throughout, and
two principal market reform periods designated by (a) output contracts (1981—87)
and (b) trade liberalization (1988—94), followed by a post-reform period (1995-
99). The overall process is characterized by a move from public ownership and
central planning to a form of private property and more competitive markets,
with enhanced incentives to produce more and more eﬃciently.
In broad terms, under the communal system, virtually all of rice production
was located in compulsory agricultural collectives, with all farm activities, includ-
ing the choice of inputs, designated by state-planning authorities. After harvest,
a portion of output was extracted by the central government. The remainder
was required by law to be sold entirely to the state at low state prices (roughly
20—30% of the estimated market price). Small private plots were allowed but only
for the household consumption of subsidiary agricultural goods, and since indi-
vidual eﬀort was hard to accurately determine the distribution of rice within the
commune was based on egalitarian criteria. As a apparent result of these controls
the output of rice fell markedly and especially so over the period 1977—80, forcing
Vietnam to import large amounts of rice, roughly 1.5 million tons or 13 percent of
total food requirements per year (GSO, 1995 and SDP, 1995), to meet domestic
demand.
The period of output contracts corresponds to a move to de-collectivize agri-
culture. Plots of land were allocated to prior members of the commune and
farmers were allowed to organize production activities privately, in what eﬀec-
tively was a tentative first move towards private property rights. Although, for
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the most part, rice was still required to be sold in state markets at low state
prices, private domestic markets (for some portion of output sold, roughly 20%)
inevitably emerged and were condoned by state authorities. In fact, the period is
generally characterized by a ‘dual price’ system (a low state price and a compet-
itive market price), albeit with strict controls to prevent arbitrage opportunities
between markets.
The period of trade liberalization established eﬀective private property rights
over both land (initially 10—15 year leases) and capital equipment, albeit with
restrictions on farm size (along with initial allocations to prior commune members
in non-contiguous blocks) and prohibitions against the removal of land from rice
production. Production decisions were de-centralized, all farm income (after tax)
was retained by the farmer and in 1990 the central government abolished the dual
price system. Rice could now be sold on competitive domestic markets with an
incentive structure that rewarded individual eﬀort. In 1993 tenure arrangements
over land were extended (to 20 year leases), although blocks were further redivided
into smaller areas among family members, provisions for the exchanging of leases
and the sale of land were introduced and farmers (through voluntary cooperatives)
could now sell rice freely in international markets. In the post reform period
(1995-99), all prior reforms in the period of trade liberalization where retained, if
not further guaranteed, and a number of more minor restrictions on input markets
(especially those for labour) where removed. Nevertheless, rural capital and land
markets remain far less developed, with considerable diﬃculty in obtaining a loan
and if granted a loan with a term longer than one year.
As a whole, the eﬀects of market reform on rice production are striking, with
the more pervasive the degree of liberalization the higher the rate of growth of rice
output. Table 2 shows this clearly. Although rice output has increased steadily
over the periods of market reform, the growth rate of rice output is significantly
higher in the second stage of reform, or the period of trade liberalization. Labour
inputs have increased slowly over time and sown areas of land have actually de-
creased. Material inputs (such as fertilizer), although clearly important have
grown more slowly than output in each period, while investment has increased
dramatically from 1988—94, continuing in the post reform period (1995-99), ap-
parently accounting for much of the high rates of growth in output throughout
the period. The last column of Table 1 shows the annual growth rates for total
factor productivity (TFP), calculated in the usual way as Solow residuals. In all
stages TFP exhibits positive growth, with little apparent technological change.
It is the argument of this paper that TFP will partly depend on the extent of
market reform and part of the exercise to follow involves a decomposition of TFP
to capture this eﬀect.
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3. Data sources and variables
Two data sets are used in this paper. The first, used for estimating productivity
change and the contribution of incentive eﬀects to productivity growth, is aggre-
gate time series data for the period 1976-99. The key variables are rice output,
labour, land, material inputs (fertilizer, seeds, insecticide), capital (tractors and
buﬀalo), rice output and input prices. The second data set used in the estimates
of the stochastic production frontier (section 5) is a balanced panel data set, cross-
sectional for 60 provinces in Vietnam, from 1991 to 1999, or 540 observations in
total. Estimates of the share coeﬃcients in the stochastic production function are
also used to calibrate the ‘institutional production function’ and derive measures
of total factor productivity with market reform in sections 4.4 and 4.5. Data
sources and various adjustments are described in detail the appendix. A brief
description of the main variables of interest is contained in table 3 with summary
statistics listed in table 5.
A few additional remarks are in order. As mentioned, although rice is pro-
duced in every one of the 60 provinces in Vietnam, the Red River Delta (RRD)
and the Mekong River Delta (MRD) are the main rice growing regions. The small-
est producers of rice (less than 100,000 tons per year) are Binh Phuoc province,
which is relatively small in area, and the principal coﬀee (Gialai Kontum) and
mining (Cao Bang, Bac Kan). The largest rice output provinces (more than a
million tones per year) are located in the MRD (Tien Giang, Soc Trang, Long
An, Kien Giang, An Giang) which as a whole accounts for roughly half of Viet-
nam’s output of rice, although only 27 per cent of the country’s population. In
terms of natural conditions, the MRD and the RRD are the most favorable for
growing rice, with up to three rice crops per year. The average farm size in the
RRD (0.5 hectare/farm) is smaller than the average farm size for the country (1.8
hectare/farm) and much smaller than in the MRD (3.8 hectare/farm). However,
the number of threshing machines in the RRD is almost double that of the MRD.
In the MRD, with a large volume of high-quality rice exports, rice processing
takes place in mills rather than on the farm to maintain international standards.
4. Market reform and total factor productivity
4.1. The technical production function
The model of the eﬀects of market reform on agricultural output is based on
the approach used by McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989) to analyze Chinese
agriculture, extended by Che, Kompas and Vousden (1999, 2001) to account for
the nature of rice production and the various market reform measures introduced
in Vietnam. Let εn represent the level of eﬀort of a typical farmer so that for
N workers εnN is the eﬀective contribution of labour to output measured in
‘eﬃciency units’. As mentioned, the value of εn can be broadly interpreted to
include everything that determines the quality of the farmer’s labour as well as
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the willingness to literally exert more eﬀort due to the enhanced incentives that
accompany market reform and the removal of externally imposed restrictions on
the kinds of tasks a farmer may undertake.
With security over land tenure and the freedom to manage farm production,
the typical farmer may be expected to manage land-use in a way which increases
the productivity of a given area. To capture this eﬀect let L represent total sown
area and let εl capture the eﬀort associated with exploiting and managing the
land. Optimal land use may involve eﬀort directed towards increasing the number
of crops sown in a given area or simply the planning involved in increasing the
yield on a given amount of land. With reform, for example, it was common in
Vietnam to initiate multiple cropping of rice and certainly so relative to produc-
tion plans in the communal period. The total input of land measured in eﬃciency
units is given by εlL.
Assume a ‘technical’ constant returns to scale production function4
Q = α0(εnN)α1(εlL)α2Mα3Kα4 (4.1)
where Q, L, M , and K represent output, land, material inputs (e.g., fertilizer
and seeds) and physical capital or, in per capita terms,
q =
Q
N
= α0εα1n ε
α2
l l
α2mα3kα4 (4.2)
where q, l, m, k are output, land, material inputs, and capital per farmer.
4.2. The farmer’s profit function
In principle, farmers may work in diﬀerent institutional settings that vary from a
communal system to various forms of share-contracting and private competitive
markets. Let farm income received be given by
y = βp(q − d) (4.3)
where p is the price of the agricultural good at which output is sold and d is
a constant term that can be considered as the fixed rent or lump-sum tax the
farmer has to deliver to the state for the right to use the property. Outside of
pure communal arrangements, the value β is the fraction of the additional revenue
generated that the farmer is allowed to keep, so that β can be considered as a
share-cropping contract between the landlord (the State) and the farmer. For
our purposes, the value βp also represents an average goods price including three
components defined as
βp = (βsps + βmpm + βwpw) (4.4)
4This is consistent with the empirical literature on agricultural production functions for
twenty-two developing countries (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) and China (Tang, 1980). The
specification is confirmed for panel data for Vietnam, 1990 to 1999, in section 5.2
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where ps, pm and pw are the state price, the market-clearing price and the export
price respectively and βs,βm and βw are the fractions or shares of agricultural
output, that sum to one, allocated or delivered to the state, the domestic market
or sold internationally. Diﬀerent regimes imply diﬀerent values for βp. Under
the communal system, the farmer was required to sell the entire agricultural out-
put to the State at a low state controlled price, implying that βs = 1. In the
output-contracts stage of reform, domestic markets existed but were still tightly
controlled, with the farmer still required to sell the major share of output to the
State at the low compulsory price, with the remainder to be sold on the domestic
market at a higher domestic market price. No trade in international markets
was allowed and arbitrage between state and domestic markets was rigorously
enforced. With the period of trade liberalization, the state market was eﬀectively
abolished, controls were largely removed from the domestic market and inter-
national trade was permitted. Rice output was allocated between domestic and
world markets at higher prices, with the diﬀerential between domestic market
prices and the world export price pw becoming increasingly smaller.5
Assume the farmer chooses inputs in order to minimize costs. With constant
returns to scale, minimizing costs subject to equation (4.1) gives a total cost (TC)
function
TC = c0
\
i
wαii Q (4.5)
where αi are the share parameters in the technical production function, c0 is a
constant defined by
c0 = α−10 α
−α1
1 α
−α2
2 α
−α3
3 α
−α4
4 (4.6)
and wi are input prices indexed across eﬀective labour, eﬀective land, material
inputs and capital. Define W (w) ≡
T
iw
αi
i as the average (real) factor price, so
that the cost function per farmer (C) can be given as
C = c0W (w)q. (4.7)
During the process of market reform, factor markets in Vietnamese agriculture
changed considerably in terms of both their structure and their speed of develop-
ment. In the earlier stages, some types of inputs were ‘free’ (such as the labour
of the farmer), or unpaid, receiving only implicit or in-kind payments. With
market reform such payments became explicit and it is necessary to take into
account any resulting increases in input costs. In addition, more importantly, in
Vietnam, as is the case in many transitional economies, factor and product prices
generally increase at diﬀerent rates with market reform, with changes in factor
prices lagging behind the increase in product prices. To capture these eﬀects,
5Since Vietnam is a natural exporter of agricultural goods, its export price will exceed its
domestic market price under autarky with free internal trade, which in turn will exceed its
domestic price under tightly regulated domestic markets. All prices are higher than the state-
controlled price.
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define ω ≡W (w)/βp as a weighted-cost share parameter or the ratio of observed
average factor to product prices. The farmer’s profit function (π) thus becomes
π = βp(q − d)− c0W (w)q = βp [q(1− c0ω)− d] (4.8)
using equations (4.3) and (4.7) and the definition of ω.
4.3. Optimal behavior and the institutional production function
Following McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989), assume the farmer receives utility
from income but dislikes the eﬀort of hard work and of planning for more eﬃcient
use of land, so that
U(π, εn, εl) = π −
εzn
zδ
− ε
z
l
zδ
(4.9)
where δ > 0 and z > 1 are constants, so that marginal disutility of eﬀort increases
with eﬀort. The eﬀort-disutility coeﬃcient z is analogous to the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion and δ is chosen to guarantee that the utility function is jointly concave.
It is assumed that z is that same across eﬀort variables for labour and land,
although this clearly could be generalized. Substituting from equations (4.2) and
(4.8) gives
U(π, εn, εl) = βp

α0εα1n ε
α2
l l
α2mα3kα4(1− c0ω)− d

− ε
z
n
zδ
− ε
z
l
zδ
. (4.10)
Consider the farmer’s optimal choice of eﬀort levels. Maximizing (4.10) with
respect to εn and εl implies that optimal values for labour and land eﬀort must
satisfy
ε∗n =

δβp(1− c0ω)α0lα2mα3kα4α(z−α2)/z1 α
α2/z
2
1/ν
(4.11)
and
ε∗l =

δβp(1− c0ω)α0lα2mα3kα4α(z−α1)/z2 α
α1/z
1
1/ν
(4.12)
for ν = (z − α1 − α2). Finally, substituting equations (4.11) and (4.12) into the
per capita technical production function, or (4.2), and multiplying both sides by
N, gives the following ‘institutional’ production function
Q = ANγ1Lγ2Mγ3Kγ4 (4.13)
where the total factor productivity coeﬃcient A is given by
A = αz/ν0 [δβp(1− c0ω)](α1+α2)/να
α1/ν
1 α
α2/ν
2 (4.14)
and share parameters are
γ1 = (zα1 − α1 − α2)/ν γ2 = zα2/ν γ3 = zα3/ν (4.15)
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and
γ4 = zα4/ν (4.16)
for labour, land, material inputs and capital respectively.
The institutional production function captures the farmer’s response to in-
stitutional arrangements and government policies, through changes in eﬀective
prices βp and the average ratio of input to product prices ω. It is equation (4.13)
rather than (4.1) that would be estimated using observable input and output
data. In this equation total factor productivity (A) and the optimal choice of
eﬀort depend both on the price level p, eﬀective product prices βp and the ratio
of average input to eﬀective output prices ω, variables which clearly diﬀer from
one stage of market reform to the next.
4.4. Total factor productivity with market reform
This section uses the market reform augmented share parameters from the esti-
mates of the institutional production function, the values of γ in equation (4.13),
to derive estimates of total factor growth calculated as a Solow residual for each
of the years 1981-99. Values for these share parameters are drawn from the esti-
mate of the stochastic production frontier, which follows in section 5. The values
for capital, labour, land and material inputs (table 7) are 0.17, 0.13, 0.24 and
0.51 respectively. The annual growth rate for total factor productivity (A) is
calculated in the usual ‘growth accounting’ manner as the diﬀerence between the
growth of output and the growth of each input weighted by share parameters.
The resulting estimates of the year-by-year growth rates for A are then used to
calculate an index for TFP using the average of the years 1976-80 in the com-
munal period as the base. These figures are summarized in table 2. Average
fitted annual growth rates are also given for the communal regime (1976-80) and
for each of the two main reform stages, or output contracts (1981-87) and trade
liberalization (1988-94), as well as the post-reform period (1995-99).
The eﬀects of market reform are striking. In the communal period output
and TFP increased by only 0.4 and 0.6 per cent per year. With the output
contracts stage of reform and the period of trade liberalization, both output and
TFP growth rates increased dramatically, with the more extensive the degree of
market reform the larger the relevant growth rates. The growth of TFP is in
the trade liberalization stage is almost double that of output contracts. These
impressive continued throughout the post reform period, albeit with a slight fall
in the growth of rice output to 5.72 per cent compared to 6.14 per cent under
trade liberalization.
It is usual in studies of this kind to attempt to explain the sources of TFP
growth. However, in the case of Vietnam this is diﬃcult. In particular, there are
no reliable figures for human capital, a potentially large factor in productivity
improvement. However, we are able to directly estimate the incentive component
of TFP and its relative contribution to growth since the beginning of the reform
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process. While this may be a poor substitute for direct observation of human
capital accumulation and learning by doing, it does provide us with an estimable
measure of productivity change that can be directly related to policy, or market
reform, through changes in the ‘institutional’ parameters βp and (1− c0ω). Ac-
cordingly, we now consider the relative importance of these incentive eﬀects in
Vietnamese TFP growth for rice.
4.5. Contribution of Incentive Eﬀects
In this section the institutional production function is used to decompose TFP
(A), given equation (4.14), into two components; the first attributable to incentive
eﬀects as captured in the eﬀort variables, or
A1 = [βp(1− c0ω)](α1+α2)/ν (4.17)
and the second
A0 =

δα1+α2αz0α
α1
1 α
α2
2
1/ν (4.18)
as an ‘unexplained residual’ reflecting the influence of a host of other factors,
where A1 · A0 = A. While z, δ,α1 and α2 are all known (or can be calculated)
and are assumed to be time invariant, α0 will change over time. With the available
data set, its time path cannot be estimated and thus we cannot directly estimate
the time path of A0. However, the time path of A has already been estimated as
a Solow residual (section 4.4) and we have time series data for the ‘institutional
variables’ βp and c0ω so that a time path for the incentive component of TFP or
A1 can be estimated.
Given the relationship that exists between the share parameters in the tech-
nical and institutional production function, equations (4.15) and (4.16), it is
straightforward to calculate the estimated values of αi from the values of γi
and the work-disutility coeﬃcient z. Following McMillan, Whalley and Zhu
(1989:793), the eﬀort disutility coeﬃcient can be derived directly from equation
(4.14) with a knowledge of βp. To simplify, calculate z from the approximate
growth rate of A in two contiguous years during the communal system and within
a given reform period, where the average weighted-cost share parameter ω and β
are roughly the same. Using values for βp and given the estimated value of the
proportional growth in total factor productivity from section 4.4 , z can be shown
to range from 2.8 to 3.2. A value of z = 3 is chosen for all calculations. The
approximate values of the share parameters in the technical production function
are thus α1 = 0.38, α2 = 0.26, α3 = 0.3 and α4 = 0.10 for labour, land, mater-
ial inputs and capital respectively.6 Figure 3 represents the values of βp and ω
6Given the relative importance of fertilizer in rice production, the share parameters for Viet-
nam do not diﬀer much from the estimates for agricultural production obtained by Tang (1980)
for China (0.50 for labour, 0.25 for land, 0.15 for material inputs and 0.10 for capital) and
for twenty-two other developing countries (0.53, 0.10, 0.16 and 0.21, respectively) reported by
Hayami and Ruttan (1985). The diﬀerence in the estimates for labour in Vietnam may be
explained by the use of labour work days rather than (the unavailable) work hours.
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(drawn from table 3) over the sample period, with increases in rice prices until
1996 (from initially low state prices) and a fall in the weighted ratio of input
to output prices until 1992 (due principally to the fall in the price of fertilizer),
afterwards rising throughout or until 1999.
Using all information, the resulting indexed series for A1 (the communal pe-
riod is set equal to 100) can be calculated, along with the proportion of TFP
growth due to A1. All measures are summarized in table 3, which also indicates
the average annual growth rates for all relevant variables for the two market re-
form and the post-reform periods. The growth rates in output, inputs and TFP
are also repeated from table 2, again showing that the more extensive is the de-
gree of market reform the larger is the growth of both rice output and TFP. It
is clear from the results that although the incentive component is quite strong
in the period of trade liberalization (1988-94), this eﬀect dissipates (and indeed
shows negative growth) in the post-reform period. The reason is clear. A fall in
the price of rice and increases in the ratio of input to output prices, or a fall in
(1−c0ω), results in a fall in eﬀective per unit profits τ , which drives the incentive
eﬀect. Much of the increase in input prices is explained by an increase in the
relative cost of hired, which doubled between 1980 and 1999, with much of the
increase occurring in the late 1990’s. Since 1994 the price of labour increased at
a rate of 7.2 per cent per year. In addition, although the cost for fertilizer de-
creased from 1980 to 1994 at a rate of about 6 per cent per year, market pressures
resulted in an increase from 1995 to 1999 at a rate of 12 per cent per year. The
cost of capital per a unit of output has also increased by 3.7 per cent per year
since 1995 (estimated from Rice Farm Surveys (1994), the State Department of
Prices (1995, 2001) and Nguyen T. Hien (1991).
The relationship between the incentive component of TFP and total TFP is
illustrated for Vietnam in figure 4 which graphs the time paths of the indices of A
(TFP) and A1,the incentive component. The diagram does not intended to show
any absolute relationship between A and A1 because both indices are set equal to
100 in the initial period (the communal regime). Rather, the graphs illustrate the
cumulative growth of the incentive component relative to the cumulative growth
of TFP. The bold vertical lines in the figure indicate the switch from the output-
contracts to the trade liberalization regime in 1987 and from trade liberalization
to the post reform period in 1995. The transition to a more extensive market
reform regime is thus seen to result in a rapid increase in both TFP and the
incentive component of TFP. Moreover, after 1987, cumulative growth due to the
incentive eﬀect rises steadily from just over one-third of cumulative TFP growth
in 1987 to three-fifths of cumulative TFP growth in 1994. However, after 1995,
the incentive component begins to diminish rapidly, although the index for TFP
continues to increase throughout (perhaps due to increases in irrigation and better
rice seeds). Given the decrease the incentive eﬀect, it is natural to ask what other
policy measures would be appropriate to increase productivity and eﬃciency. We
now turn to this issue.
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5. Stochastic production frontier and eﬃciency
5.1. Stochastic frontiers and ineﬃciency
Stochastic production frontiers were first developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The specification allows for
a non-negative random component in the error term to generate a measure of
technical ineﬃciency, or the ratio of actual to expected maximum output, given
inputs and the existing technology. The idea can be readily applied to panel
data, following Battese and Coelli (1995). Indexing firms by i = 1, 2, ..., n, the
stochastic output frontier is given by
Yit = f(Xit,β)evit−uit (5.1)
for time t = 1, 2, ..., T , Yit output, Xit a (1× k) vector of inputs and β a (k × 1)
vector of parameters to be estimated. As usual, the error term vit is assumed
to be independently and identically distributed as N(0,σ2v) and captures random
variation in output due to factors beyond the control of firms. The error term uit
captures firm-specific technical ineﬃciency in production, specified by
uit = zitδ +wit (5.2)
for zit a (1×m) vector of explanatory variables, δ a (m× 1) vector of unknown
coeﬃcients and wit a random variable such that uit is obtained by a non-negative
truncation ofN(zitδ,σ2u). Input variables may be included in both equations (5.1)
and (5.2) as long as technical ineﬃciency eﬀects are stochastic (see Battese and
Coelli, 1995).
The condition that uit  0 in equation (5.1) guarantees that all observations
lie on or beneath the stochastic production frontier. A trend can also be included
in equations (5.1) and (5.2) to capture time-variant eﬀects. Following Battese and
Corra (1977) and Battese and Coelli (1993), variance terms are parameterized by
replacing σ2v and σ2u with σ2 = σ2v + σ2u and γ = σ2u/(σ2v + σ2u). The technical
eﬃciency of the i-th firm in the t-th period for the basic case can be defined as
TEit =
E(Yit | uit, Xit)
E(Yit | uit = 0,Xit) = e
−uit = exp(−zitδ −wit) (5.3)
and clearly must have a value between zero and one. The measure of technical
eﬃciency is thus based on the conditional expectation given by equation (5.3),
given the values of vit−uit evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters in the model, where the expected maximum value of Yit is conditional
on uit = 0 (see Battese and Coelli, 1988). Eﬃciency can be calculated for each
individual firm per year by
E[exp(ui) | vi + ui] = 1−Φ(αa + γ(vi + ui)/σa
1−Φ(γ(vi + ui)/σa)
exp

γ(vi + ui) + σ2a/2

(5.4)
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for σa =
s
γ(1− γ)σ2 and Φ(·) the density function of a standard normal random
variable (Battese and Coelli, 1988). The value of γ = 0 when there are no
deviations in output due to ineﬃciency and γ = 1 implies that no deviations in
output result from stochastic random eﬀects with variance
5.2. Econometric specification
Generalized likelihood ratio tests are used to help confirm the functional form
and specification. As a pre-test, the null hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas form of
the production function was tested against a general translog specification by
setting the relevant parameters for squared and interaction terms in the translog
form equal to zero. The resulting test statistic was χ210 = 9.4 compared to a
critical value of 19.7. A Cobb-Douglas functional form was thus selected. Ac-
cordingly, equation (5.1) for unbalanced panel data set (1990—1999) is specified
by a production function in log-linear Cobb-Douglas form, or
lnYit = β0+β1 lnKit+β2 lnLABit+β3 lnLANit+β4 ln IN+β6T+vit−uit (5.5)
where Yit is the output of rice, K is the stock of capital (tractors and buﬀalo),
LAB is labour in working days, IN is material inputs and T is a time trend.
The provincial ‘farm-specific’ factors used in the technical ineﬃciency model,
or equation (5.2), are average farm size (SIZE), the percentage of paddy in which
tractors are used (TL), a binary variable indicating soil conditions (SOIL), 1 for
the main rice growing regions, or the MRD and the RRD, the number of threshing
machines (MA) and the number of tractors (CA), so that
uit = δ0+δ1 lnSIZEit+δ2 lnTLit+δ3SOILit+δ4 lnMAit+δ5 lnCAit+ωit (5.6)
for ωit ∼ N(0,σ2ω). As mentioned, specific input variables can be included in
equation (5.6) as along as technical ineﬃciency eﬀects are stochastic and input
variables in the production function are exogenous to the composite error term
(Battese and Coelli, 1995).7
Additional likelihood ratio (LR) tests are summarized in Table 6. Correct
critical values from a mixed χ-squared distribution (at the 5% level of significance)
are drawn from Kodde and Palm (1986). The relevant test statistic is
LR = −2{ln[L(H0)/L(H1)]} = −2{ln[L(H0)]− ln[L(H1)]} (5.7)
where L(H0) and L(H1) are the values of the likelihood function under the null
and alternative hypotheses respectively. The null hypothesis of a deterministic
time trend in equation (5.6) is rejected. The null hypothesis that technical ineﬃ-
ciency eﬀects are absent (γ = δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = 0) and that farm-specific
7See Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980) for a general discussion of the use of input variables
in a technical ineﬃciency model.
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eﬀects do not influence technical ineﬃciencies (δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = 0) in equa-
tion (5.6) are both rejected, as is δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = 0. Finally, the
null hypothesis that γ = σ2u/(σ2v + σ2u) = 0, or that ineﬃciency eﬀects are not
stochastic, is rejected. All results indicate the stochastic eﬀects and technical
ineﬃciency matter and thus that traditional OLS estimates are not appropriate
in this study. Additional LR tests reject non-constant returns to scale.
5.3. Results
Table 7 summarizes the results for the stochastic production frontier and ineﬃ-
ciency models. The coeﬃcients on capital, labour, land and material inputs are
0.17, 0.13, 0.24 and 0.51 respectively. A time trend also tests as significant at 1.1
per cent per year.8 Results show that farms in the main rice growing regions, those
with larger farm size, those that use more threshing machines, and farms with a
higher proportion of rice land ploughed by tractor are more eﬃcient. The size of
the binary variable SOIL is perhaps the least surprising. Superior conditions for
growing rice in the MRD and RRD, compared especially to the highlands in the
north, are clearly reflected in provincial-wide measures of eﬃciency throughout
the sample period (table 8). The MRD in particular consistently ranks best in
eﬃciency, year-to-year. Figure 5 compares average technical eﬃciency between
the MRD and RRD (the principal rice areas) and Vietnam as a whole. The mea-
sures for the MRD and RRD are 11 to 13 per cent higher throughout than the
average for Vietnam as a whole. The policy requirement that rice be produced
in every province of Vietnam thus appears inappropriate, at least in terms of the
potential loss in eﬃciency that results from producing rice outside of the Mekong
and Red River Deltas.9
The coeﬃcient for the proportion of rice land ploughed by tractor (TL) is also
substantial at -0.35, and remains large even when testing with MRD and RRD
taken separately. An increase in number of tractors in rice fields clearly increases
eﬃciency. The are two policy concerns here. First, and most importantly, the
absence of an credit market undoubtedly limits the amount of tractors in rice
production. Transactions costs on loans in rural areas are prohibitive and when
granted are often for terms of only one year or less. Indeed, much of the oth-
erwise rapid increase in capital in the reform periods and after (table 2), is due
to accumulation from retained earnings, and not from borrowing (Che, Kompas
and Vousden, 2001). Second, land policy itself often makes it diﬃcult to employ
tractors in rice fields. Plots are often small and butt directly to adjoining plots
(separated only by a mound of dirt) and restrictions against farm size and con-
8By comparison, a more standard panel data set regression (with random eﬀects) contained in
Kompas and Che (2001) for the period 1991 to 1994 gives share parameters for capital, labour,
land and material inputs is 0.12, 0.17, 0.27 and 0.47 respectively. The sharp increase in the
number of tractors since 1995 (SDAFF, 2001) may partly explain the diﬀerence in estimates.
9For an analytical discussion for land policy and land policy reform in Vietnam, see Che
(1997), Duncan (1998) and Marsh and MacAulay (2002).
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tiguous plots (especially in the north), often make the use of tractors impractical,
or at least not without a good deal of cooperation among farmers.
The coeﬃcient of average farm size is smaller than may be expected, but
still indicates that government restrictions on farm size limit eﬃciency. However,
this value rises considerably when estimating over the RRD and MRD (regions
of comparable fertility) taken separately. In a data set that includes only the
RRD the coeﬃcient on average farm size in the technical ineﬃciency model is
-2.7, while in the MRD it is -0.1, both significant at the one percent level. This
makes good sense. In the RRD, where restrictions on farm size are more severe
and more broadly enforced, average farm size is small at 0.5 hectare per farm,
compared to 3.8 hectares per farm in the MRD, so that eﬃciency gains are far
from exhausted. The reason for smaller farm size in the RRD is usually attributed
to a high population density in rural areas in the north combined with a policy
that allocated equal (and non-contiguous) plots of land to all commune members
with reform, as well as the explicit legal and moral restrictions against ‘excessive
land accumulation’. Moreover, although land can be leased in the north for up to
20 years there still is no well-developed market for the exchange of land or leases.
To a lesser extent this also applies to the south as well. Thus, smaller farm size,
the consequent smaller proportion of tractors used in rice fields, more restrictive
land regulations and the slightly worse natural soil conditions in the RRD explain
the lower levels of eﬃciency compared to the MRD.
The coeﬃcient on threshing machines is also relatively small, but it should be
noted that the MRD has about a third of the threshing machines of the RRD. In
the MRD, where a large proportion of rice is destined for export, quality standards
require that rice be sent directly to the mills for processing. The coeﬃcient on
the number of tractors, as opposed to the proportion of rice land ploughed by
tractors, is positive for the simple reason that in most rural areas (other than
the MRD and RRD) tractors are used for general transportation and for other
industrial crops or small-scale industry. When testing for the MRD and RRD
alone, where tractors are mostly dedicated for rice production, the coeﬃcient
tests at -0.18, as expected.
Finally, although average technical eﬃciency is low for Vietnam as a whole
(59.2 percent) it is clear that eﬃciency for rice farms in Vietnam and in the
principal rice growing provinces (MRD and RRD) has been rising over time,
albeit slowly, from roughly 55 to 65 per cent in Vietnam as a whole and 66 to 78
per cent for the principal rice growing areas (figure 5). The gradual increase in
the amount of capital (tractors and buﬀalo) is undoubtedly the key explanation
for this trend. The only exception is the year 1994 where all areas experienced
a fall in eﬃciency and especially so in the MRD and RRD. The reason for this
fall appears to be largely due to Resolution 5 (Nguyen Sinh, 1995), outlined first
in 1993, which further redivided farm size into smaller and non-contiguous plots,
allocated now across prior family farm members. Previous technical eﬃciency
measures were not recovered until three of four years later, or 1997 for Vietnam
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as a whole and 1998 for the principal rice growing areas.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has focused on the eﬀects of the reforms which have occurred in Viet-
namese rice production since 1980. A simple model is used to consider optimizing
behavior by farmers based on an ‘institutional’ production function, which reflects
not only the usual technical relationship between inputs and outputs, but also
eﬀort responses to the institutional and market arrangements within which farm-
ers work. Assuming farmers choose their eﬀort levels optimally, it is possible to
estimate these ‘incentive eﬀects’ at each stage of reform and compare them with
the overall change in total factor productivity. Results show that this incentive
component represents a higher proportion of post-1980 total factor productivity
growth for the later trade liberalization stage of reform than for the earlier, more
reform-limited output contracts stage. We also observe an earlier response of
productivity to reform in the south than in the north, conceivably because of the
more recent experience of market institutions in the south. The overall results
confirm that the more extensive is market reform the larger the increase in TFP
and the share of TFP growth due to incentive eﬀects, suggesting that more com-
petitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly. Nevertheless, in the
post reform period (1995-99), the incentive eﬀect dissipates as the world price
of rice falls and the prices of inputs finally begin to rise. Stochastic frontier es-
timates indicate that eﬃciency can be enhanced through appropriate additional
reforms, especially with respect to land and capital markets. In particular, the
requirement that rice be grown in every province in Vietnam, restrictions on farm
size (especially in the north) and the slow development of rural credit markets for
capital and land are seen to restrict the level and growth of eﬃciency substantially.
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APPENDIX: Data Sources and Adjustments
Original data sources are drawn mainly from the General Statistics Oﬃce of
Vietnam (GSO) and the SDAFF (Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries) 2001, and related project investigations, studies and reports by
Vietnamese organizations, such as the State Planning Committee (SPC), the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry (MAFI), the Ministry of
Water Resources (MWR), the State Department of Price (SDP), and international
organizations including the World Bank (WB) and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO).
The balanced panel data set used for estimation of the stochastic production
frontier for rice is cross-sectional for 60 provinces over the years 1991 to 1999
and is obtained from the National Investigation of Rural Regions (SDAFF, 2001
and GSO, 1995b). A rice equivalent for output is chosen rather than rice output
alone since in the same rice fields farmers usually overlap production with other
short-term cereal crops, such as sweet potatoes and maize. Time series data for
rice output is from SDAFF (1991) and MAFI (1991) for the period 1976-90, from
SDAFF (1995a) for 1990-93, GSO (1995) for 1994 and the SDAFF (2001) for
1995 to 1999. All measures were verified by alternative data sets contained in the
SDAFF (2001) for the years 1975-1999. A rice equivalent output is chosen rather
than rice output alone, because in the same rice fields farmers usually overlap
production with other short-term cereal crops, such as sweet potatoes and maize.
Since there is clear (nutritional) substitution between rice and these grains (SDP,
1995a), the State’s target usually emphasizes output in terms of a rice equivalent
rather than rice only.
Labor is measured as person-days and is obtained by multiplying average
person-days per hectare in agriculture (SRF, various issues) by the rice cultivated
area (SDAFF (1991, 1994, 1995b), MAFI (1991), GSO (1995), SDAFF (2001).
Average working day per hectare for rice production is 245.4 for the north and
161.5 for the south respectively (SDAFF, 2001, SDP, 2002, SRF, 1995).
The land input is measured as the sown area of rice, with data provided by
(SDAFF, 2001). The Vietnamese government divides the soil quality of land into
seven levels and levies land tax depending on quality (UNDP-FAO, 1989). An
investigation by the World Bank (WB, 1994b) distinguished the quality of soil
into five grades in terms of cultivated area. Sold conditions and irrigation is more
advanced in the Red River Delta than in the Mekong River Delta (MWR, 1994
and WB, 1995). According to the World Bank (1995), the diﬀerence in output
between zero and 100 percent irrigation on a farm amounts to 645 kg/hectare
of rice, everything else equal. Capital inputs are obtained as a weighted sum
of draught animals (SDAFF (1992, 1995a), MAFI (1991) and GSO (1995)) and
tractors (SDAFF, 2001). The conversion from the number of draught animals to
tractor capacity is based on (Blomqvist, 1986) and assumes that a bullock-day
(a pair of bullock working 8 hours) is approximately the same as a tractor-hour
at 15 to 25 horsepower. Total capital input for rice production is then derived as
19
the total capital input for cultivation multiplied by the proportional share of rice
cultivated area to the total cultivated area of agriculture.
Material inputs include the nutrition content of all fertilizers (organic and
chemical), insecticides and seeds (Tang, 1980, Sicular, 1988). The conversion
factor used to aggregate organic and chemical fertilizers is similar to that used by
Tang (1980:61). Following Tang (1980, p.61) and Sicular (1985), total material
input variable is constructed by a measuring the nutrition content of all fertilizer
(organic and chemical), insecticide, and seeds that are used for rice production.
The total nutrition content of all fertilizer is determined from the nutritional
content of organic and chemical fertilizer separately. Here, the amount of organic
fertilizer for the rice industry is derived from the total amount of organic fertilizer
used for agriculture. Organic fertilizer for agriculture is assumed to be supplied
from two main sources: night soil and large animal manure (buﬀaloes, cattle
and pigs). The population-adjusted night-soil equals the rural population (GSO,
2000) multiplied by a rural utilization rate (0.9). The standard number of large
animals equals the sum of buﬀaloes, cattle and pigs (GSO, 2000), for which the
weighted ratios are 1, 1 and 0.33 respectively. Organic fertilizer for rice production
is obtained by multiplying the amount of organic fertilizer for agriculture with the
weighted ratio between food grain area sown to the total sown area for cultivation.
The chemical fertilizer data used for rice production is derived directly from the
multiplication of the average amounts of chemical fertilizer used (1992) in the
north 165.4 kg/ha and the south 193 kg/ha (the Survey of Rice Farmers, SRF)
and the rice area in every province (SDAFF, 2001). The data set for insecticides
is constructed by multiplying the average use of insecticide per hectare in the
year 1992, or 5.8 kg and 7.6 kg in the north and south, respectively, (SRF, 1993)
and total rice area (SDAFF, 2001). The data for seeds are calculated from the
average use of seeds per hectare in 1992, or 140 kg/ha and 240 kg/ha in the north
and south respectively (SRF, 1995) multiplied by the total rice area (GSO, 1995).
The time series for chemical fertilizers is calculated from the average amounts of
chemical fertilizer used per hectare multiplied by cultivated area in each year
(SDAFF, 2001). The series data for insecticides and seeds are calculated from
the average use of insecticide and seeds per hectare (SDAFF, 1996) multiplied by
rice area for each year.
The value of β, equation (4.4), in the output contracts stage of reform is set
at a market share of 0.8, 0.2 and zero for the state, domestic and international
market. This is average data computed from the GSO, 1994 years) in which
the market share is 0.88, 0.12 (in 1985), 0.82, 0.18 (in 1986) and 0.82, 0.18 (in
1987) for state and domestic markets for grains. Research by the State Planning
Committee in 1995 also used the rate 0.8, 0.2 to adjust the multiple prices for
grain at this time. In the stage of trade liberalization, the share of output sold
to the state was clearly zero, with the share between domestic and international
markets was obtained from average GSO data from 1988-94.
Time series data for nominal rice prices for 1976-94 was obtained from the
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State Department of Price (SDP, 1996). These prices are multiplied by the ap-
propriate values of β as in equation (3.4) to obtain an average nominal rice price.
To convert this to an average real price, it would normally be usual to deflate by
the consumer price index. However, in the case of Vietnam, such price indices
are highly volatile and unreliable due largely to poor and erratic construction
methods. Under the circumstances, a more reliable measure of the underlying
rate of inflation is the Dong/U.S. dollar exchange rate which is used here as the
deflator for βp. This is in line with the high correlation between the Vietnamese
inflation rate and the ratio Dong/$US noted by the World Bank (1994:67-68) and
is a measure commonly used by the Vietnamese (especially so during periods of
high inflation). Following the practice of the State Department of Price (SDP),
the nominal rice price in Nam Dinh and Can Tho is taken to represent the rice
price in the north and south respectively. The price of rice from 1995 to 1999 is
from the SDAFF, 2001.
The number of tractors, average farm size the proportion of land ploughed by
tractor for rice and the number of threshing machines are obtained from SDAFF,
2001. Input prices used to construct the weighted-cost share parameter ω, are
measured in rice units or, for example, how many tons of rice farmers have to
pay to get one ton of urea, to employ one thousand labour work-days, or to rent
one hectare of land. Many oﬃcial data sources for input expenditures are already
measured in terms of rice units as a matter of practice. The time-series data for
the relative price of urea to rice are drawn from the Central Price Committee
(CPC), as reported in Nguyen Hien (1991) and Nguyen Khiem (1995).
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Table 1: Main statistics for Vietnamese rice production, 1976 to 1999
Year Output Sown land Yield Net Exports
(‘000 tons) (‘000 ha) (tons/ha) (‘000 tons)
1976 11,827.2 4,710.0 1.8 -728.2
1977 10,597.1 4,710.0 1.6 -1,258.8
1978 9,789.9 4,664.0 1.5 -172.4
1979 11,362.9 4,618.0 1.7 -1,400.2
1980 11,647.4 4,572.0 1.8 -959.2
1981 12,415.2 4,526.0 1.9 -571.0
1982 14,390.2 4,481.0 2.3 -318.2
1983 14,743.3 4,435.0 2.3 0.2
1984 15,505.6 4,389.0 2.5 -276.0
1985 15,801.1 4,297.0 2.6 -387.8
1986 15,937.6 4,250.0 2.7 -416.3
1987 15,043.4 4,243.0 2.6 -375.2
1988 16,938.1 4,109.0 2.8 -365.8
1989 18,933.7 4,108.0 3.1 1,227.6
1990 19,167.2 4,108.0 3.0 1,453.7
1991 19,563.7 4,101.0 3.0 774.0
1992 21,536.9 4,100.0 3.2 1,664.0
1993 22,783.1 4,039.0 3.3 1,456.6
1994 23,474.2 4,039.0 3.3 1,684.0
1995 24,903.6 4,203.5 3.5 1,988.0
1996 26,332.7 4,387.6 3.6 3,003.0
1997 27,467.3 4,199.5 3.7 3,575.0
1998 29,075.3 4,213.4 3.7 3,730.0
1999 31,315.1 4,213.4 3.9 4,508.0
Sources: The Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, General Statistics
Office of Vietnam (SDAFF), 2001
Table 2: Rice production in Vietnam, annual growth rates (%), 1976 to 1999
Period Output Labor Land Material inputs Capital TFP
1976-80 0.40 0.41 -0.80 -1.10 2.20 0.60
1981-87 4.56 0.33 -1.30 3.21 2.23 2.74
1988-94 6.14 1.98 -0.52 2.78 7.54 4.43
1995-99 5.72 2.32 0.50 1.08 9.88 4.46
Figure 1: Rice production in Vietnam (‘000 tons), 1976 to 1999
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Figure 2: Net Exports of Rice in Vietnam (‘000 tones), 1976 to 1999
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Table 3: Description of output and input variables
Variables Denotation Description Units
Output Y Total paddy equivalent output Tons
Capital K Total capital, including buffaloes, cattle and
tractors
‘000 horsepower:
Labour LAB Total days working ‘000 working days
Land LAN Sown land area used ha
Material inputs IN Total material inputs, e.g., fertilizers, seeds
etc
‘000 tons standard
NPKfertilizers tones
equivalentTractor number CA Total number of tractors units
Farm size SIZE Average farm size ha/farm
Tractor used proportion TL Proportion of land ploughed by tractor over
total land
per cent
land use for rice production
Natural conditions SOIL Soil and weather conditions 1 for RRD &
MKR0 for other areas
Threshing machines TM Total number of threshing machines used units
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Figure 3: Rice price index (βp ) and relative price of inputs/output (ω= W(w)/βp) index
for Vietnam, 1981-99 (1976/80=100)
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Sources: Estimated from the sources from the State Department of Price of Vietnam and the
State Planning Committee.
Figure 4: The cumulative growth of output, total factor productivity (A) and the part of
total factor productivity due to market reform (A1) for Vietnam
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Table 5: Summary statistics for key variables for 60 provinces in Vietnam, 1991-99
Variables Units Average Stdev Min Max
Output (Y) ‘000 tons 419.4 445.6 31.2 2,100.0
Capital (K) ‘0000 horse power 11,591.2 13,732.7 325.4 79,902.9
Labor (LAB) ‘000 working days 17,205.8 15,173.2 978.4 114,847.2
Land (LAN) ‘000 hectare 120.9 106.7 12.2 514.3
Material inputs (IN) ‘000 tons 44.1 30.5 3.9 145.0
Tractor number (CA) units 1,455.4 2,717.6 2.0 31,123.0
Farm size (SIZE) hectare/unit 1.8 1.4 0.2 4.5
Tractor used proportion (TL) percentage 0.4 0.3 0 1.0
Threshing machines (MA) units 2,325.2 6,419.4 0.8 69,541.0
Table 6: Generalized likelihood ratio tests, parameter restrictions for the stochastic
production frontier and technical inefficiency models (equations 5.5 and 5.6)
Null hypothesis χ2-statistic χ20.99-value Decision
for Regression 1
γ =δ0=δ1 =δ2 =δ3 =δ4 =δ5 =0 151.62 19.38 reject H0
γ =0 23.54 8.27 reject H0
δ0=δ1 =δ2 =δ3 =δ4 =δ5 =0 411.4 17.75 reject H0
δ1 =δ2 =δ3 =δ4 =δ5 =0 139.7 16.07 reject H0
Note: The critical values for the hypotheses are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986).
Table 7: Parameter estimates of the stochastic production frontier and technical
inefficiency models for Vietnam (equations 5.5 and 5.6)
Coefficient Asymptotic T-ratio
Stochastic production frontier model
Constant 0.40*** 2.30
(0.17)
Capital (K) 0.17*** 8.78
(0.02)
Labor (LAB) 0.13*** 4.07
(0.03)
Land (LAN) 0.24*** 6.94
(0.04)
Material inputs (IN) 0.51** 1.61
(0.03)
Time (T) 0.011*** 4.88
(0.002)
Technical inefficiency model
Constant 0.63*** 6.10
(0.1)
Average farm size (SIZE) -0.03*** 2.60
(0.01)
Tractor used proportion (TL) -0.35*** 4.46
(0.08)
Natural conditions (SOIL) -0.29*** 7.45
(0.04)
Threshing machine (MA) -0.01* 1.54
(0.01)
Tractor number (CA) 0.04*** 2.81
(0.02)
Sigma-squared 0.07*** 11.74
Gamma 0.94*** 18.84
Ln (likelihood) 9.87
Mean Technical Efficiency (per cent) 59.2
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10 level, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
Figure 5: Average technical efficiency during 1991-1999 for Vietnam and the principal
rice areas (the Red River Delta and the Mekong River Delta)
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Table 8: Predicted technical efficiency for rice production in Vietnam (60 provinces),
1991-99
Zone and Province 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Red River Delta Zone
1 Ha Noi 0.21 0.51 0.51 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.49
2 Hai Phong 0.44 0.55 0.60 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.61
3 Ha Tay 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.44 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.59 0.66
4 Hai Duong 0.48 0.67 0.87 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.74 0.77 0.79
5 Hung Yen 0.48 0.66 0.86 0.55 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.75 0.77
6 Ha Nam 0.48 0.62 0.67 0.50 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.68
7 Nam Dinh 0.56 0.73 0.81 0.59 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.75
8 Thai Binh 0.67 0.90 0.96 0.80 0.84 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.83
9 Ninh Binh 0.50 0.71 0.79 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.70 0.75 0.74
North East Zone
10Ha Giang 0.44 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.64 0.66 0.71
11Cao Bang 0.41 0.34 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.54
12Lao Cai 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.58
13Bac Kan 0.35 0.39 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.44
14Lang Son 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.51 0.49
15Tuyen Quang 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.71
16Yen Bai 0.42 0.54 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.72
17Thai Nguyen 0.37 0.50 0.61 0.59 0.51 0.47 0.51 0.65 0.64
18Phu Tho 0.34 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.58
19Vinh Phuc 0.38 0.55 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.54 0.57 0.61
20Bac Giang 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.55
21Bac Ninh 0.54 0.76 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.74 0.56 0.61
22Quang Ninh 0.50 0.64 0.71 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.56
North West Zone
23Lai Chau 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.37 0.49 0.49 0.55
24Son La 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.53
25Hoa Binh 0.57 0.49 0.59 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.66
North Central Southern Zone
26Thanh Hoa 0.49 0.51 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.42 0.56 0.59 0.65
27Nghe An 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.61 0.56 0.60
28Ha Tinh 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.48 0.60
29Quang Binh 0.38 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.49
30Quang Tri 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.36 0.51 0.59 0.58 0.47 0.65
31Thua Thien Hue 0.52 0.52 0.41 0.32 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.56
South Central Southern Zone
32Da Nang 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.84
33Quang Nam 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50
34Quang Ngai 0.59 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.58
35Binh Dinh 0.62 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.60
36Phu Yen 0.74 0.70 0.52 0.66 0.64 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.76
37Khanh Hoa 0.62 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.62
Central Highland Zone
38Kon Tum 0.62 0.62 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.54 0.45 0.48
39Gia Lai 0.48 0.40 0.39 0.33 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.47
40Dak Lak 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.46 0.51 0.42 0.49
North East Southern Zone
41 Hochiminh City 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.51 0.51 0.52
42 Lam Dong 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.35
43 Ninh Thuan 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.82
44 Binh Phuoc 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.32
45 Tay Ninh 0.61 0.46 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.66
46 Binh Duong 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.64 0.64 0.71 0.71 0.74
47 Dong Nai 0.53 0.47 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.54
48 Binh Thuan 0.58 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.62
Mekong River Delta Zone
49 Long An 0.72 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.72
50 Dong Thap 0.77 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.91
51 An Giang 0.85 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.89
52 Tien Giang 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.86
53 Vinh Long 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.71 0.70
54 Ben Tre 0.75 0.69 0.68 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.54 0.52
55 Kien Giang 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.97
56 Can Tho 0.83 0.84 0.74 0.84 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.96
57 Tra Vinh 0.77 0.70 0.53 0.96 0.72 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.80
58 Soc Trang 0.74 0.73 0.59 0.76 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.88 0.93
59 Bac Lieu 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.65 0.81 0.86
60 Ca Mau 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.79 0.78 0.68 0.85 0.86
